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ABSTRACT
A Grey parrot (Psittacus erithacus), able to quantify 6 or fewer item sets (including heterogeneous
subsets) by using English labels (I. M. Pepperberg, 1994), was tested on addition of quantities involving
0–6. He was, without explicit training, asked, “How many total X?” for 2 sequentially presented collections
(e.g., of variously sized jelly beans or nuts) and required to answer with a vocal English number label. His
accuracy suggested (a) that his addition abilities are comparable to those of nonhuman primates and
young children, (b) some limits as to his correlation of “none” and the concept of zero, and (c) a possible
counting-like strategy for the quantity 5.

Studies of number concepts in animals, particularly those involving nonhuman primates (e.g., Boysen &
Hallberg, 2000), have been suggested as a means to examine the evolution of numerical processes in
humans. According to some researchers, animals’ number sense is a neurally based, evolutionarily
inherent skill (e.g., Dehaene, 1997) on which human competence is based. Thus, the sensitivity to
ordinality and numerosity demonstrated by apes, lions, monkeys, dolphins, pigeons, coots, crows, and
rats should not be surprising (e.g., Beran, 2004; Biro & Matsuzawa, 2001; Brannon & Terrace, 2000;
Judge, Evans, & Vyas, 2005; Kilian, Yaman, von Fersen, & Güntürkün, 2003; Lyon, 2003; McComb,
Packer, & Pusey, 1994; Nieder, Freedman, & Miller, 2002; Olthof & Roberts, 2000; Shumaker, Palkovich,
Beck, Guagnano, & Morowitz, 2001; Smith, Piel, & Candland, 2003; Thompson, 1968; Xia, Emmerton,
Siemann, & Delius, 2001; for additional references, see Pepperberg & Gordon, 2005; cf. Dehaene, 2001).
Several researchers, however, consider more advanced numerical abilities— exact counting of quantities
of four or more and arithmetic operations—to be uniquely human and based on language skills (Spelke &
Tsivkin, 2001).
In this view, language, in conjunction with cognitive systems present in humans and other animals,
underlies humans’ unique development of number knowledge. Supposedly, for animals and young
children (≤ 3 years), one form of language-independent representation handles exact numerosities up to
and including four by tracking distinct individual members of a set (i.e., items are not seen as a set);

another language-independent system dealing with approximate numerosity takes over for larger
quantities. The latter system fails to represent each set member as a persisting individual (Spelke &
Tsivkin, 2001) and thus cannot accurately track amounts over four (e.g., a set can be judged as more or
less than other sets, but the specific amount cannot be determined). These systems seem to relate,
respectively, to subitizing and estimating (Davis & Pérusse, 1988), subitizing being defined (e.g.,
Kaufman, Lord, Reese, & Volkmann, 1949) as a fast, effortless, and accurate perceptual apprehension of
number usually of four or less that uses preattentive mechanisms and generally involves linear or
canonical patterns of objects (think dice or dominoes); and estimation being a perceptual apprehension of
larger numbers, influenced by density and the regularity of the objects’ distribution that enables
approximations (e.g., between 80 and 100; see Dehaene, 1997, pp. 70–72). In this view, language
abilities involving reference and ordering of labels that emerge as children mature allow them to integrate
knowledge of quantity in the small sets with their initially rotely memorized number sequence to form 1:1
correspondences—that is, generate symbolic representations of number—that can be extended to larger
amounts and thus achieve exact accuracy for sets above four (Carey, 2004; Carey & Spelke, 1994;
Spelke & Tsivkin, 2001). Other researchers have offered somewhat differing explanations of how children
acquire the ability to symbolize number, to count, and to do arithmetic (e.g., suggest use of spatial skills,
such as number lines), but they agree that most animals do not exhibit such behavior, at least for
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numbers greater than four (e.g., review in Mix, Huttenlocher, & Levine, 2002).
Animals trained with human-based symbolic systems using Arabic numerals (chimpanzees: Boysen &
Berntson, 1989; Matsuzawa, 1985) or with human speech including number words (Grey parrots:
Pepperberg, 1987, 1994) would, however, seem to provide intermediary links between animals lacking
such training and children. Chimpanzees can both choose Arabic numerals to quantify a collection from
zero to eight (production) and pick the appropriate collection of items after seeing an Arabic numeral
(comprehension; zero to three: Boysen & Hallberg, 2000; one to nine: Biro & Matsuzawa, 2001; note
Beran & Rumbaugh, 2001). At least one Grey parrot vocally has produced English quantity labels to
identify sets of six or fewer items, including novel items, random patterns, and subsets of heterogeneous
groups (e.g., number of blue blocks within groupings of blue and green blocks and balls, Pepperberg,
1994) and has demonstrated comprehension of these vocal numbers, including some simple
understanding of a zero-like concept (Pepperberg & Gordon, 2005). In all cases, although these animals
have both successfully used human symbols and exceeded the four-unit stricture suggested as the divide
between animal and human number competence, the extent to which they understand and use number
when compared to young children (e.g., Mix et al., 2002) is still unclear.
For example, only one study, on an ape, involved summation and required that the animal symbolically
label the sum (Boysen & Berntson, 1989); the study, however, used a quantity totaling only four. Other
studies, involving additive and subtractive tasks and using larger numbers of objects (up to 10), used only
one type of token and required subjects to choose the larger amount, not label the final quantity (e.g.,
Beran, 2001, 2004; Rumbaugh, Savage-Rumbaugh, & Hegel, 1987; Rumbaugh, Savage-Rumbaugh, &
Pate, 1988).2 This procedural difference is important. When only one type of token (e.g., marshmallows)
is used in studies of relative amounts, evaluations of contour and mass, rather than number, could be
responsible for the responses (Rousselle, Palmer, & Noël, 2004; see review in Mix et al., 2002), as was
the case for pigeons (Olthof & Roberts, 2000). In these studies, however, the close phylogenetic
relationship between apes and humans (Olson & Varki, 2004) and knowledge of the similarities between
hierarchical demands of the apes’ ecological and social structures and those of early humans (foraging
priorities, fission–fusion relationships; Boysen & Hallberg, 2000; Rumbaugh et al., 1987), as well as
recent studies on possible parallels in brain areas underlying numerical judgments in humans and
monkeys (Göbel & Rushworth, 2004; also Dehaene, Piazza, Pinel, & Cohen, 2003), suggest that such

data reflect an evolutionary continuum in numerical abilities. Whether such a continuum extends to
nonprimates is unclear.
It is of interest to note that not all the arithmetical studies cited above involved the quantity zero. Zero is
unique in that counting and adding presuppose something to add or count, and the absence of quantity
seems to present some initial confusion for children (see Bialystok & Codd, 2000). Apes’ use of zero has
not been shown to be fully equivalent to that of humans. Thus, although the chimpanzee Sheba was
tested with the placard “0” in her addition trials and could match a single empty food tray to this placard,
she never had to respond to the total absence of objects to be added (Boysen & Berntson, 1989). In the
Rumbaugh et al. (1987, 1988) studies, the chimpanzees Sherman and Austin had to choose the greater
quantity between two collections in which one food well could be empty but were not asked to label the
results; Beran’s (2001, 2004) studies also did not involve labeling zero. And Ai, who was trained to both
produce and comprehend zero with respect to the absence of quantity, was not tested on zero in terms of
arithmetic (Biro & Matsuzawa, 2001).
I now report evidence to suggest that a Grey parrot, Alex, a creature with considerable evolutionary
distance from both human and nonhuman primates, but with similar ecological demands and possibly
similar social structures in nature (Pepperberg, 1998), demonstrates, without training, summation
capacities comparable to those of nonhuman primates, involving labeling of amounts up to six. Of interest
was that these experiments were unplanned. My students and I had begun a sequential auditory number
session (training to respond to, for example, three computer-generated clicks with the vocal label “three”)
with another bird, Griffin, in the standard manner, by saying “Listen,” clicking (this time, twice), and then
asking “Griffin, how many?” Because Griffin refused to answer, we replicated the trial. Alex, who often
interrupts Griffin’s sessions with phrases like “Talk clearly” or who occasionally answers even though he
is not part of the procedure, said “four.” I told him to be quiet, assuming that his vocalization was not
intentional. We then replicated the trial yet again with Griffin, who remained silent; Alex now said “six.” I
thus decided to replicate the Boysen and Berntson (1989) study as closely as possible under constraints
of having a subject who was not allowed to move about the laboratory on his own and to extend the study
to further work on zero. Data from these experiments not only demonstrated Alex’s competence in
addition, but also present intriguing evidence that he may use a counting-like strategy for the quantity five
and that his concept of zero, although closely related to absence, is not as fully developed as that of
humans.
Method
Subject and Housing
Alex, a 28-year-old male Grey parrot (Psittacus erithacus), had been the subject of cognitive and
communicative studies for 27 years, including those involving numerical competence (Pepperberg, 1987,
1994; Pepperberg & Gordon, 2005). Testing locations and living conditions when neither testing nor
training was in progress were described in Pepperberg and Wilkes (2004). Food and water were available
at his vocal request at all times during testing. In this study, he used his previously documented ability to
vocally label quantities up to and including six (Pepperberg, 1994).
Apparatus
Testing involved familiar objects. The tray that formed the substrate for all trials had been used for
previous studies on label comprehension (Pepperberg, 1990, 1992), object permanence (Pepperberg &
Kozak, 1986), and other number capacities (Pepperberg, 1994; Pepperberg & Gordon, 2005). I, along
with other trainers, concurrently used the same tray for training spatial concepts and phoneme and Arabic

number recognition (e.g., Pepperberg, in press-a, in press-b), so the tray was not a cue for addition.
Plastic cups used to cover items to be added were also familiar, being the subject of queries on color and
on the concepts of same versus different and relative size, and used as containers for object permanence
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and in concurrent training for a recursion study. Items to be summed were familiar treats (e.g., candy
hearts, variously sized jelly beans, pieces of nuts). Such items were used rather than the usual nonfood
objects because of their small size and their interest to the parrot. Note that only the hearts were of one
consistent size, so that tasks generally involved objects of different mass and contour.
Procedure: Object Presentation
In the absence of any prior training, an addition trial began when an experimenter, out of Alex’s line of
sight, placed objects, counterbalancing number sets on the right and left across trials, onto the surface of
the tray and covered the items with plastic cups. When multiple objects were placed under a single cup,
each object was spaced less than 1 cm from other nearest items, and generally, the distance was less.
The experimenter brought the tray up to Alex’s face, lifted the cup on Alex’s left, showed him what was
under the cup for 2–3 s in initial trials, and then replaced the cup over the quantity; the procedure was
replicated for the cup on Alex’s right. In trials comprising the last third of the experiment, Alex was given
approximately 10–15 s to view the items under each cup. The experimenter made eye contact with Alex,
who was then asked, vocally, and without any training, to respond to questions, such as “How many nut
total?” No objects were visible during questioning. He had previously demonstrated he could respond
vocally to our queries (Pepperberg, 1999). To respond correctly, he had to remember the quantity under
each cup, perform some combinatorial process, and then produce a label for the total amount. He was
not given any time limit in which to respond, but if he did not answer within about 5 s, the question was
restated; if he grabbed and overturned a cup, the objects were covered, he was shown both sets of
objects sequentially, and the question was restated. Given that his time to respond was generally
correlated with his current interest in the items being used in the task, rather than the task itself
(Pepperberg, 1988), I did not record latency to respond.
General Testing Procedure
Test sessions on a single numerical array of various object collections occurred on average 2–5 times a
week from June 2004 to January 2005, with breaks for student vacations, intersessions, and a hiatus
from November 2004 through mid-January 2005.4 Test questions were presented intermittently either
during free periods (when birds were requesting various foods or interactions) or during sessions on
current (and thus unrelated) topics (e.g., using Alex to assist in training another parrot on color labels)
until all questions for the experiments were presented.
Details of test procedures, including descriptions of precautions against inadvertent and expectation
cuing, can be found in Pepperberg (1981, 1990, 1994); summaries are below. A trial would be repeated in
a session only if Alex’s initial answer was incorrect or if his grabbing a cup required re-presentation as
noted above (e.g., Pepperberg, 1981, 1987). Thus, the number of times an array was presented to Alex
generally depended on his accuracy. If Alex produced the appropriate label, he received praise and the
objects to which the question referred or was allowed to request an alternative reward. No further
presentations of the same material then occurred; that is, there was only a single “first trial” response. If
an identification was incorrect or indistinct, the examiner removed the tray of objects, turned his or her
head, and emphatically said “No!” This procedure was used in order to penalize a “win–stay” strategy,
and presentation continued until a correct identification was made or four attempts occurred; errors were
recorded.

As in all studies with Alex, the protocol differed from ones used with other animals in two respects. First,
the task capitalized on Alex’s ability to work in the vocal mode; second, each trial was presented
intermittently during training and testing of other unrelated topics also under study. Alex’s responses thus
had to be chosen from his entire repertoire (more than 90 vocalizations, including labels for foods and
locations) and from among numerous possible topics concerning various exemplars and questions during
each session; that is, Alex had to attend to the specific type of question being posed. This design not only
increased the complexity of the task, but prevented several forms of cuing (see below; see also
Pepperberg, 1999; Premack, 1976, p. 132).
Controls Against Expectation and Experimenter-Induced Cuing
Test situations included specific precautions to avoid cuing. One control was a design such that each test
session was, as noted above, presented intermittently during free periods or work on unrelated topics. An
examiner who, for example, poses a series of similar questions may come to expect a particular answer
and unconsciously accept an indistinct (and, by our criteria, incorrect) response of, for example, “gree” (a
mix of “green” and “three”) for “green.” As noted above, Alex’s responses had to be chosen from his
entire repertoire and from among numerous possible topics during each session; each session contained
only a single number array. Second, in general, an experimenter other than the one presenting the tray
(one of five possible individuals in these studies), who did not know what was on the tray, confirmed the
answer; his or her interpretation of Alex’s response was thus unlikely to be influenced by expectation of a
certain number label. Only after his or her confirmation was Alex rewarded (Pepperberg, 1981). Third, this
evaluator was unlikely to be influenced by hearing the type of question posed: In a previous study,
transcriptions of contextless tapes of Alex’s responses in a session agreed at a rate of 98.2% with original
evaluations (Pepperberg, 1992).5 Fourth, because Alex had not been trained on this task, no overlap
occurred between training and testing situations, and because training on number labels had occurred
years before, Alex could not have picked up on trainer-induced cues specific to a given label
(Pepperberg, 1981); moreover, because a total of six different experimenters were involved in the testing,
the presence of a particular individual could not cue a number session. Fifth, I also used several different
common treats in testing, including those used for training the other birds (e.g., various jelly beans for
training on colors); thus, particular objects would not cue Alex that a number test was in progress. Not
even the specific concatenation of tray, cups, and treats could cue him, as the arrangement was not
exclusively used on number trials (e.g., it was similar to that used in the recursion study in progress) and
thus did not signal a number test.
Approximately 15% of trials were videotaped to check further for cuing and interobserver reliability. I used
video so as to be able to check for Alex’s attention and motivation. One trial was discarded from the
addition analysis because Alex was indeed not attending to the tray, but the trial was kept for an
interobserver reliability check because of the clarity of the response. Observers for reliability did not watch
the video but listened as if they were scoring in the laboratory, stating what they heard Alex say. If
interobserver reliability with blind coders was high, I could be assured of the validity of other trials. Given
that Alex was far more interested in the human who was taping as well as the camera and mike than in
the objects to be enumerated, such trials were difficult to execute and were kept to a minimum.
Scoring
Alex’s test scores were calculated in two ways. Because the test procedure required that, if Alex erred, a
question could be repeated (up to four times) until he produced the correct response, I scored both first
trial and all trial responses. First trial results were the percentage of correct responses on first trials. The
overall test score (results for all trials) was obtained by dividing the total number of correct identifications

(i.e., the predetermined number of collections) by the total number of presentations required to obtain the
correct responses. Statistics were performed on first trials only.
To learn whether Alex’s results were statistically significant, I used two binomial tests. In one, chance
(1/6) was based on number of labels (six) relevant to the task—that is, as if Alex was randomly guessing
among all number labels after hearing “How many X total?” A second, more conservative test used a
larger value of chance (1/3), as though Alex were choosing to respond with one of the two viewed
quantities (the addends) without summing, as well as the possible answer. The least conservative
calculation (not performed) would include the probability of his producing any of the approximately 100
labels in his repertoire; all calculations assumed that Alex would always ( p = 1) attend and respond
correctly to the “How many . . . ?” question (i.e., not provide a random label that had no connection to the
task at hand).
Experiment 1: Addition
Method
Experiment 1 consisted of 48 trials using the procedures described above. I presented each total amount
eight times, in random order, in sets of six, such that no collection was shown sequentially. Addends were
displayed an equal number of times, such that, for example, amounts adding to 6 were presented as
6 + 0, 5 + 1, 4 + 2, and 3 + 3, two times each, with quantities alternating under right and left cups;
amounts adding to 5 were displayed as 5 + 0, 4 + 1, 3 + 2, and so forth; I could present 1 only as 1 + 0,
randomizing quantity under right and left cups (N.B., unless otherwise stated, all X + Y collections refer to
both X + Y and Y + X forms). All possible addend collections were also randomized; thus, the
preponderance of X + 0 trials at the end of the study occurred by chance. A full list of trials is given in the
Appendix. On a given trial, I generally used objects differing in size; for example, I used both small and
large jelly beans or irregular nut pieces to avoid issues of mass and contour. In six trials, I used identical
candy hearts to see whether Alex would be more accurate if he could use mass or contour. The number
of trials was deliberately kept low to avoid training. Finding the intriguing behavior on 5 + 0 sets (see
below), I began giving Alex more time (approximately 10–15 s) on these and all subsequent trials, noted
by an asterisk in the Appendix, and replicated the earlier 5 + 0 trials under the longer time interval.
Results
Alex’s scores were calculated several ways and examined for several types of issues (see Table 1).
Retaining the errors for the 5 + 0 trials given under the 2- to 3-s interval, I found that Alex’s accuracy was
41 of 48, or 85.4% for first trial responses ( p < .005; binomial test, chance of 1/3 or 1/6), and 48 of 60, or
80% for all trials. If replications of the 5 + 0 trials under the longer time interval are substituted, his first
trial accuracy was 43 of 48, or 89.6% ( p < .005), and 48 of 53, or 90.6% for all trials. His accuracy for
small quantities (1, 2) was 15 of 16, or 93.8% ( p < .005); his accuracy for large sums (5, 6) when given
the longer time period was 13 of 16, or 81.3% ( p < .005); the difference is nonsignificant (comparing
errors and correct scores for small vs. large trials, p = .599, Fisher’s exact test); note, too, that all the
errors for the larger sums involved apparent labeling of the addends before labeling the total. Of particular
interest was his score for his first six trials, that is, the first time he was presented with each of the sums;
his accuracy was 5 of 6, or 84.3% ( p < .02; binomial test, chance of 1/3). Using candy hearts did not help
him with the second 5 + 0 trial or the single 3 + 1 error. Although he did not err on any of the other four
trials using hearts, the number of errors overall was too small to suggest that using objects of equal mass
and contour made any difference. It is interesting to note that three of his four errors on queries other than
5 + 0 involved situations where the larger addend was on his left, that is, in reverse of the ordinal number
line; however, he was correct on 18 of these reversed-order trials, suggesting that the errors were

random (comparing errors and correct scores for reversed vs. nonreversed trials, p = .606, Fisher’s exact
test). Initially, when given only 2–3 s, he was always wrong on the 5 + 0 sum, consistently stating “6.”
When given 10–15 s, his accuracy went to 100% on 5 + 0 and 0 + 5 trials; the difference in accuracy
between the shorter and longer interval trials was significant (counting all queries for 0 + 5 and 5 + 0,
Fisher’s exact test, p = .01). For other trials, he went from 26 of 29 (89.7%, p < .005) for 2–3 s to 15 of 17
(88.2%, p < .005) for 10–15 s, essentially remaining constant.
Also of interest were interobserver reliability checks on his videotaped responses. Five different observers
from the Radcliffe Institute (four female, one male) completely unfamiliar with Alex’s speech patterns
listened to a tape for each of Alex’s number labels. On one trial, two said they could not hear Alex’s
response, but the other three correctly identified the label as “three.” On the trial for “five,” the male
observer misidentified the label, but on trials for the other numbers, all observers correctly identified all
the labels that Alex produced. If I collapse all trials over all listeners, omitting the two trials from the
listeners who could not hear the response, interobserver reliability is 96.4% (i.e., observers agreed on 27
of 28 trials).
Table 1. Results and Errors for Experiment 1

a

Sum

Score

%

p

1
2
3

8/8
7/8
8/8

100.0
87.5
100.0

4

7/8

87.5

a

Trial type error

Error descriptions

<.005
<.005
<.005

1+1

5

<.005

3+1

5

4/8

50.0

.25

6

7/8

87.5

<.005

3 (seemed to label addend)
b

3 + 2 (2 times)
c
5 + 0 (2 times)

2, 3; 3 (seemed to label addends)
6 (4 times); 6 (4 times)

3+3

3 (seemed to label addend)

Calculated on the basis of 1/3, the stricter criteria.

b

Note that if only these errors were counted, and the correct responses for 5 + 0 trials were repeated
under longer time trials, Alex’s score would have been 6/8, or 75%, and his p value would have been .02.
c

Under 2- to 3-s time limit; when trials were repeated with longer times, Alex was correct.

Discussion
Alex demonstrated some competence in summing small quantities. His results seemed independent of
the number or type of objects involved, with the exception of the 5 + 0 trials given in 2–3 s that he labeled
as “six,” and some trials involving the quantity three where he seemingly labeled the addends before
providing the sum. If the long-interval 5 + 0 trials are used, he was as accurate on small quantities
involving one or two as he was on those summing to five or six. His performance was apparently
independent of mass or contour; having equal mass or contour did not help him when the time was
restricted for 5 + 0. Thus, in general, his data are comparable to that of young children (Mix et al., 2002)
and chimpanzees (Boysen & Hallberg, 2000).
The mechanism that Alex used cannot easily be determined; the data suggest he might have used
different mechanisms in different situations. Although I have no evidence that he can count exactly as do
humans (see Fuson, 1988)—that is, (a) produce a standard sequence of number tags, (b) apply a unique
number tag to each item to be counted, (c) remember what already has been counted, and (d) know that

the last number tag used tells how many objects are there—he may have used a related strategy in some
trials. I discuss various possibilities below.
Might Alex have used a nonverbal accumulator? This system was initially proposed as a means to
enumerate sets of discrete events (numbers of sequential tones, a continuous amount of time; a switch
gates one pulse per event into an accumulator at a constant rate; its fullness indicates the total amount;
Meck & Church, 1983). It is generally posited as a mechanism for comparing sequential sets or preverbal
counting (e.g., Gallistel & Gelman, 1992). To use an accumulator, Alex would have to visually partition
and scan individual items in each addendum at a constant rate (an event for each pulse) and not reset his
accumulator for the second addendum. The system is inherently inexact because of the variability in
scanning sets of static items (i.e., the rate of pulses; see Mix et al., 2002); it produces errors normally
distributed around the correct response and shows increasing errors with increasing set size, specifically
above three; it would not provide the exact numerosities Alex’s task requires. Note that Alex did not make
more errors for larger quantities.
For collections involving X + Y, Y ≠ 0, he might have formed representations in memory for each addend
and then recalled them as a total quantity to be labeled. He could begin with object files for the individual
addends (pointers enabling the brain to keep track of particular objects; e.g., Dantzig, 1930; Kahneman,
Treisman, & Gibbs, 1992; Thomas, 1992; Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994) or some more imagistic model (of the
whole scene; e.g., Uller, Carey, Huntley-Fenner, & Klatt, 1999), then switch to a process posited by
Huttenlocher, Jordan, and Levine (1994), wherein (total) representations now provide conceptual
referents for count words (Mix et al., 2002); this process is proposed for children who are just beginning to
correlate count words and numerosities of four or more. In general, object files are posited for quantities
of four or fewer, and quantification involving such files is assumed to occur speedily (see Mix et al., 2002).
Only for the 5 + 1 set would Alex see an addend above four; he could have replied “six” simply because
he saw a large grouping (greater than four) and used, by default, his largest vocal number label. Note that
Ai responded more accurately and faster on the largest number, relative to the next largest number,
during training to expand her range of number labeling (Murofushi, 1997), suggesting a similar
mechanism. A comparable result may be seen for adult humans (Balakrishnan & Ashby, 1991; Simon &
Vaishnavi, 1996). Alex’s ability to respond correctly for 4 + 1 sets, even under time constraints, suggests
that he might use either a five-member object file or some form of representational summing in memory;
remember, no time constraints existed for his response.
Note that four of five errors on X + Y trials involved labeling one or both addends (particularly that of
“three”) before producing a correct response; the behavior occurred for 3 + 1, 3 + 2, and 3 + 3. It is
interesting to note that in the two 3 + 2 cases, the addend labels were produced after Alex beaked the
cups and lifted them on his own before answering. Possibly this combination, summing to five, was
particularly difficult, but he did correct himself, unlike the case for 5 + 0. Also, if only these errors and
results for 5 + 0 when he was given 10–15 s are counted, his score for sums of five would be 6 of 8, or
75% ( p = .02; binomial test, chance of 1/3), suggesting that a sum to five was not, in and of itself,
particularly difficult; he did not err on 4 + 1. Why he labeled three when it was an addend, in 4 of 10
instances, and, in general, did not do so with other addends, is unclear. Given that his response on the
very first trial, “three,” garnered excessive praise from testers, possibly some interference occurred that
made production of the label difficult to inhibit whenever he viewed the quantity in these circumstances.
For most X + 0 collections, he might have subitized. In general, reaction times are used to distinguish
counting from subitizing (e.g., Mandler & Shebo, 1982; Trick & Pylyshyn, 1989, 1994), but Alex cannot be
evaluated on latency to respond: His response times correlate with his desire for the rewards
(Pepperberg, 1987, 1988). Here, however, I initially constrained viewing time to 2–3 s, restricting his time
to interpret what was being presented. Thus, for X + 0, he might, as do humans, have subitized X = 1 to

4. Also, when given only 2–3 s, he may have perceived five as “lots” and, knowing “six” was his largest
label, used it as a default for anything above four. He did not simply confuse five and six; he never said
“five” for six items. Given 10–15 s for 5 + 0, he was correct, which suggests that he used additional time
to his advantage, maybe like 4- to 5-year-old children who were more accurate on five-element arrays
when given additional time (Gelman & Tucker, 1975).
The mechanism for the 5 + 0 trials is unclear. He did not subitize, precisely because he needed extra time
beyond that required for four items. If he used Huttenlocher et al.’s (1994) mental model, would inclusion
of only one item beyond four increase the time needed to recall and match a label to the five-item model?
If such a model existed, it would have been created to respond correctly in earlier number production and
comprehension studies in which he easily labeled five items (e.g., Pepperberg, 1987, 1994; Pepperberg &
Gordon, 2005); Alex would not likely have needed extra time here. And according to researchers who
study clumping or chunking in adults—dividing a set of four or more into smaller groupings that are
subitized and then summed (von Glasersfeld, 1982)—Alex would not have needed more than 2–3 s for
that mechanism unless he responded like young children, who may need more time to segment four or
five items into smaller subitizable units than do adults (Fischer, 1992). Dehaene (1997), however, argued
that the additional time needed or the decrease in accuracy when children subitize four rather than three
or fewer items has to do with four being a boundary between subitizing and estimating, not with chunking.
Also, in all discussions of subitizing versus other strategies, adults’ subitizing supposedly occurs during a
time course of at most a few hundred milliseconds (i.e., generally less than 0.35 s for four and less than
0.70 s for five; see Mandler & Shebo, 1982); in all cases, Alex had considerably more time available.
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that Alex needed more than a few seconds to individuate the set of five
elements, so that he could then use a noniterative (noncounting) mechanism (for comparisons with
children, note Huntley-Fenner, 2001).
Might Alex have analyzed 5 + 0 in stages during a longer time interval? Maybe he first rejected “four,”
which he can subitize, next dismissed the impulse to respond with his largest label, and then finally
responded by recalling a model for five. This procedure would explain the time delay but not why he did
not initially use the model if it existed for five, or why he persisted with “six” even when told he was wrong
during the shorter time interval. Having been shown the sets four times in those trials, he would have had
a total exposure equal to that of the single longer time interval.
During the longer times for 5 + 0, Alex might have used a form of nonvocal tagging, approaching that of
human counting. Work in progress shows that, despite lack of ordinality training, he understands which of
two Arabic numerals represents the larger or smaller quantity (Pepperberg, in press-b). Such data
suggest that he knows ordinal relationships among his numbers even if he cannot vocally recite a
standard number sequence. A counting-like strategy may be one logical interpretation. Preschoolers’
understanding of counting is enhanced when it is embedded in a number-relevant reasoning task, such
as addition or subtraction (Zur & Gelman, 2004); possibly this was true for Alex. His 5 + 0 trials, by
chance, did not occur until about half the trials were completed and thus until he had considerable
experience with addition. Also, counting may be facilitated by an ability to subitize and sum small groups
of items and by specific processes of recitation (nonverbal tagging) and attention (segmentation) (e.g.,
Piazza, Giacomini, Le Bihan, & Dehaene, 2003). Nevertheless, being able to label a collection correctly,
even one larger than four, does not mean, even in children, full understanding of counting. Children who
correctly respond to “How many?” may fail on “Give me X” because they associate collections and labels
but do not fully comprehend the connection between cardinality and counting—they do not understand,
for example, how to count to form a specified collection (review in Sophian, 1995).
I do propose, nonetheless, that Alex used some counting-like strategy for 5 + 0 sets. His accuracy on
4 + 1, but not 5 + 0, under constrained viewing, not response, time suggests he can track quantities up to

four, remember them, and then mentally sum them to give a correct response. He did not need anything
else for collections summing to, but not including, five, because no time constraint existed on summing.
His general accuracy on 2 + 3 may also support this claim; labeling the addends may have assisted
memory. His need for extra viewing time only for 5 + 0 suggests he used a different strategy. As for
Fischer’s (1992) argument for chunking, chunking is unlikely to take much longer than the 2–3 s Alex was
initially given; his use of a counting-like strategy could have required the extra time.
Even if Alex were counting, his use of a “counting on” strategy (Baroody & Dowker, 2003; Fuson, 1988;
Groen & Parkman, 1972; Groen & Resnick, 1977) is unlikely. Such a procedure involves representing one
addend, for example, “three,” either by subitizing or counting, then sequentially denoting each element in
the next addend, for example, “four, five” to give a total, “five.” Older children (e.g., first graders) usually
start with the larger set (Ashcraft, 1982; Groen & Parkman, 1972; Siegler, 1987); if Alex did so he might
have made significantly fewer errors when shown a larger set first (a reversal of the number line), but he
did not. Given that, as noted above, I lack data to suggest that Alex produces a standard counting
sequence, he probably does not “count on.” Children generally do not fully understand this procedure until
they are 5 or 6 years old (Bialystok & Codd, 1997); thus, Alex’s lack of this mechanism would not be
surprising.
Experiment 2: Concept of Zero
Method
Experiment 2 consisted of eight trials, interspersed randomly within those of Experiment 1, designed to
examine Alex’s concept of absence of number. Alex had never had formal instruction on a zero concept.
He had, on his own initiative, begun to use “none” spontaneously to refer to the absence of a particular
number of objects on a tray during a study of number comprehension (Pepperberg & Gordon, 2005). He
subsequently succeeded in additional trials in this format, stating “none” to questions about, for example,
five items when two, three, and six item sets were present. Now I presented questions of “How many
bean [or nut or heart]?” and put nothing under any of the cups. The goal was to determine the extent to
which he could generalize the use of “none” without instruction.
Results
On the first four trials, Alex simply looked at the tray and said nothing. He would sometimes try to lift the
cups himself, and I would then show him again, by lifting the cups one at a time, that there was nothing
present. On the fifth, sixth, and seventh trials, he said “one.” On the last trial, he again refused to answer.
Discussion
Zero is interesting because it lacks concrete reality and thus may emerge for children later than other
numerical concepts (Bialystok & Codd, 2000; Wellman & Miller, 1986); specifically, as noted above,
numerical competence is based on the assumption that something exists to enumerate, whatever the
process involved. My asking Alex to enumerate something that did not exist clearly presented a
challenge. As noted above, the question was related to that of a previous study (Pepperberg & Gordon,
2005)—for example, “What color [is the collection of] five [items]?”—when there were not five of anything
(e.g., in a collection of two purple blocks, three green blocks, and six orange blocks), but for those trials
many objects were present; here, nothing was present other than the two cups to which he had
habituated. Unlike nonhuman primates in other studies, Alex had had no formal training on the zero
concept. In contrast, the chimpanzee Sarah had received extensive training on labeling arrays of candies
and junk objects with Arabic numbers, including zero (Boysen, 1993; Boysen & Berntson, 1989), and Ai
had similar production and comprehension trials on computer monitors (Biro & Matsuzawa, 2001).

Previous to this study, Alex had generalized his understanding of “none” as a trained response to the
absence of information from questions on similarity and difference (Pepperberg, 1988) to, without training,
relative size (e.g., to respond to “What color [object] bigger?” when two objects were identical in size;
Pepperberg & Brezinsky, 1991) and the aforementioned absence of numerical sets (Pepperberg &
Gordon, 2005).
Alex’s two different responses were both intriguing. His failure to respond on five trials suggests he
recognized something was different from the other trials; that is, even if he did not understand what was
expected, he knew his standard number answers would not be correct. He did not, as he has done when
bored with a task (e.g., Pepperberg, 1992; Pepperberg & Gordon, 2005), give strings of wrong answers or
request treats or to return to his cage. He acted more like autistic children (D. Sherman, personal
communication, January 17, 2005) who simply stare at the questioner when asked “How many X?” and
there is nothing to count. His response of “one” on the fifth, sixth, and seventh trials suggests a
comparison to that of Ai, who confused “one” with “zero.” Although Alex was never trained on ordinality
and had learned numbers in a random order (review in Pepperberg, 1999), he, like Ai, seemed to grasp
that “none” and “one” represented the lower end of the number spectrum. As noted earlier, Alex
previously used “none” to denote absence of a designated number of items (Pepperberg & Gordon,
2005), which was a logical extension of his use of “none” to mark the absence of sameness or difference
with respect to various attributes of object pairs, including absence of a size difference. Here he was
asked to denote the total absence of labeled objects, a different task.
Stating this situation slightly differently might provide clarification: Previously he showed he recognized
when there were not, for example, three of anything or attributes in common for an object pair; that is, he
could search for a specific numerical set or a likeness or difference in existent object pairs and report on
absence. Now he was asked to comment on items that simply did not exist. He had not been trained to
use “none” this way. Note that he processed the query (e.g., “How many nut total?”), understanding that
he was not asked to label the number of cups; he never said “two.” Such data suggest that he views his
number labels as an attribute of a collection. For Alex, the attribute can be missing from a collection and
be labeled “none,” but the missing object itself cannot be denoted as “none.” The distinction is subtle.
Specifically, Alex’s use of “none” is not isomorphic with the adult human use of “zero,” in that he does not
use “none” as he does his number labels (e.g., Pepperberg, 1987) to denote a specific numerosity; that
is, he does not view “none” as a numeral or numeric label. Nothing in his training would lead him to do so.
In that sense, he is like humans in earlier cultures, who did not see zero as a quantity that could be
labeled (Bialystok & Codd, 2000).6
Arguably, had he responded “none,” might an interpretation have been that he misunderstood the
question—that is, assumed that I had asked “What color bigger/smaller?” or “What’s different?” He had
not, however, misunderstood the question in previous such trials; he never said “none” when two equal
amounts were under the cups, and there was no reason to assume he would have misunderstood the
question for this case. Moreover, he had previously demonstrated that he carefully attended to the
several different questions I could ask about object pairs (e.g., “What toy?”; “How many?”; “What’s
same/different?”; and “What color bigger/smaller?” to two blocks of different colors and sizes;
Pepperberg, 1999).
In sum, I suggest that his understanding of “none” as a zero-like concept with respect to absence may
resemble that of young children, who seem to have to be about 4 years old before they achieve full
adultlike understanding of labels for zero and other numerals (Bialystok, 2000; Bialystok & Codd, 2000;
Wellman & Miller, 1986). Thus, whether Alex can acquire a full understanding of the equivalence of
“none” to the concept of zero is still to be determined.

Conclusions and Future Directions
This study demonstrates four previously unreported behavior patterns involving numerical competence in
a nonhuman, nonprimate, nonmammalian subject. First, as noted above, I did not intend to examine
Alex’s abilities with respect to addition, but he gave evidence of such ability on his own. Second, Alex had
to remember the addends and combine them to form a representation of the total, which is a more difficult
task than simply labeling a visible set. Third, he demonstrated that his concept of zero is not isomorphic
with that of adult humans, but does match that of young children and possibly apes. Finally, the data may
provide evidence of a counting-like strategy.
Alex’s considerable training on use of human number labels may, of course, have enabled him to use
representational abilities that would otherwise have been inaccessible. As noted previously (Pepperberg
& Gordon, 2005), Alex has had over 2 decades of training on human vocal communication; he is thus
similar to Matsuzawa’s (1985) Ai, Boysen’s (1993) Sheba, and Premack’s (1976) and Boysen’s (1993)
Sarah. All such animals are special in their extensive enculturation to human cognitive tasks, and their
achievements suggest that numerical concepts beyond those involving very small quantities (i.e., up to
four) are functional in at least some nonhumans. The factor of enculturation is emphasized by data on the
human Piraha˜ tribe, who lack number labels and whose numerical abilities (they seem to have “one,”
“two,” and “many,” if that; Gordon, 2004) appear to be far less complex than those of enculturated
nonhumans.
Most likely, animals’ abilities to learn in the laboratory are based on an existent cognitive architecture
(Pepperberg, 1999); their training merely provides a way to examine the extent to which this architecture
matches that of educated humans (see Jarvis et al., 2005). For humans, data suggest that specific brain
areas are involved in representations of numerical quantities, including addition (e.g., Dehaene et al.,
2003; Lemer, Dehaene, Spelke, & Cohen, 2003); how might a parrot brain function on tasks such as
those given Alex? Does he have a homologue or analogue of human inferior parietal cortices, particularly
the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and inferior parietal lobule, the human areas supposedly tied to numerical
competence (e.g., Lemer et al., 2003)? Note that many number comparison tasks involve issues of
spatial attention and nonsymbolic comparisons, which are also correlated to IPS activity (Coull & Nobre,
1998; Fias, Lammertyn, Reynvoet, Dupont, & Orban, 2003; Göbel, Johansen-Berg, Behrens, &
Rushworth, 2004; Jordan, Schadow, Wuestenberg, Jeinze, & Jäncke, 2004; Simon, 1999)7 and which are
essential for nonhuman survival; thus, nonhumans are likely to have analogous brain areas (note Walsh,
2003). It is interesting to note that data from one study (Kawashima et al., 2004) suggest that the left
intraparietal cortex is activated more in adults than in children during all numeric tasks, which suggests
that either maturation or experience might be an issue (but see Spelke & Dehaene, 1999). Might Alex’s
training—and that of other nonhumans given extensive training on numerical symbols (e.g., Biro &
Matsuzawa, 2001; Boysen & Berntson, 1989)—have expanded capacities of these animals toward a
representational ability more similar to that of humans than that which exists in untrained animals
(Pepperberg, 1999; Pepperberg & Gordon, 2005) or even untrained humans (Gordon, 2004)? Clearly,
Alex’s numerical abilities are not identical to those of children, but his exposure to and training on such
tasks are also limited compared to that of an average preschooler. I suggest that whatever brain areas he
uses do indeed function in an analogous manner to primates, given the similarities in data.
Clearly, additional studies are needed to determine the full extent of Alex’s numerical capacities. I still
need to determine whether he can learn both to produce and understand the meaning of an ordinal
number sequence and to use “none” as a numeral. I need to study whether he can, like apes and young
children, understand subtraction (e.g., Boysen & Berntson, 1989, 1990; Fuson, 1988) and whether both
addition and subtraction can be extended to symbolic use of his Arabic numbers.

1

Gallistel and Gelman (1992) argued for a preverbal counting mechanism that enables animals to
perform some mathematical operations, but they (like other cited researchers) considered only small
quantities and approximate answers for operations involving larger quantities. See Gelman and Cordes
(2001) for an updated version of their thesis, including somewhat larger numbers (e.g., five).
2

Other studies have used smaller quantities (e.g., 0–4) and will not be discussed because tasks involving
these small quantities can be solved by perceptual mechanisms (see discussion in Beran, 2004).

3

Thus, Alex was used to having objects hidden under cups, knowing that hidden items had not
disappeared, and being asked about hidden items.
4

In late November 2004, Alex began to exhibit the same kind of inattention documented in Pepperberg
and Gordon (2005); instead of persevering with trials that would then likely have to be discarded, I
switched to testing on a different topic for 10 weeks.
5

This percentage represented 106 matches of 108 vocalizations. As an additional control, the principal
investigator made two transcriptions of a student, new to the lab, as he responded to the same type of
questions as Alex. The first transcription was live; the second, made several days later, was of a tape
from which all questions had been edited. The two transcriptions of the student’s vocalizations matched to
within 95.8% (68 of 71 vocalizations).
6

Alexandrian Greeks, for example, used zero to denote the absence of quantity, but it did not function for
them as a number (Kline, 1972).

7

Note that Coull and Nobre (1998) have suggested that the left IPS is more active in temporal attention
and the right IPS is more active in spatial attention, but Fias et al. (2003) found more activity in the left
IPS for representation of symbolic and nonsymbolic magnitude. All cited studies do, however, implicate
the IPS in numerical tasks.

References
Ashcraft, M. H. (1982). The development of mental arithmetic: A chronometric approach. Developmental
Review, 2, 213–236.
Balakrishnan, J. D., & Ashby, F. G. (1991). Is subitizing a unique numerical ability? Perception &
Psychophysics, 50, 555–564.
Baroody, A. J., & Dowker, A. (Eds.). (2003). The development of arithmetic concepts and skills:
Constructing adaptive expertise. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
Beran, M. J. (2001). Summation and numerousness judgments of sequentially presented sets of items by
chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 115, 181–191.
Beran, M. J. (2004). Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) respond to nonvisible sets after one-by-one addition
and removal of items. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 118, 25–36.
Beran, M. J., & Rumbaugh, D. M. (2001). “Constructive” enumeration by chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)
on a computerized task. Animal Cognition, 4, 81–89.
Bialystok, E. (2000). Symbolic representation across domains in pre-school children. Journal of
Experimental Child Psychology, 76, 173–189.
Bialystok, E., & Codd, J. (1997). Cardinal limits: Evidence from language awareness and bilingualism for
developing concepts of number. Cognitive Development, 12, 85–106.
Bialystok, E., & Codd, J. (2000). Representing quantity beyond whole numbers: Some, none and part.
Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 54, 117–128.

Biro, D., & Matsuzawa, T. (2001). Use of numerical symbols by the chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes):
Cardinals, ordinals, and the introduction of zero. Animal Cognition, 4, 193–199.
Boysen, S. T. (1993). Counting in chimpanzees: Nonhuman principles and emergent properties of
number. In S. T. Boysen & E. J. Capaldi (Eds.), The development of numerical competence:
Animal and human models (pp. 39–59). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Boysen, S. T., & Berntson, G. G. (1989). Numerical competence in a chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes).
Journal of Comparative Psychology, 103, 23–31.
Boysen, S. T., & Berntson, G. G. (1990). The development of numerical skills in the chimpanzee. In S. T.
Parker & K. R. Gibson (Eds.), “Language” and intelligence in monkeys and apes: Comparative
developmental perspectives (pp. 435–450). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University
Press.
Boysen, S. T., & Hallberg, K. I. (2000). Primate numerical competence: Contributions toward
understanding nonhuman cognition. Cognitive Science, 24, 423–443.
Brannon, E. M., & Terrace, H. S. (2000). Representation of the numerosities 1–9 by rhesus macaques.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 26, 31–49.
Carey, S. (2004, Winter). Bootstrapping & the origin of concepts. Dædalus, 133, 1–10.
Carey, S., & Spelke, E. (1994). Domain specific knowledge and conceptual change. In L. Hirshfield & S.
Gelman (Eds.), Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture (pp. 169–200).
Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
Coull, J. T., & Nobre, A. (1998). Where and when to pay attention: The neural systems for directing
attention to spatial locations and to time intervals as revealed by both PET and fMRI. Journal of
Neuroscience, 18, 7426–7435.
Dantzig, T. (1930). Number: The language of science. London: Macmillan. Davis, H., & Pérusse, R.
(1988). Numerical competence in animals: Definitional issues, current evidence, and a new
research agenda. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 11, 561–615.
Dehaene, S. (1997). The number sense. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
Dehaene, S. (2001). Subtracting pigeons: Logarithmic or linear? Psychological Science, 12, 244–246.
Dehaene, S., Piazza, M., Pinel, P., & Cohen, L. (2003). Three parietal circuits for number processing.
Cognitive Neuropsychology, 20, 487–506.
Fias, W., Lammertyn, J., Reynvoet, B., Dupont, P., & Orban, G. A. (2003). Parietal representation of
symbolic and nonsymbolic magnitude. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 15, 47–57.
Fischer, J.-P. (1992). Subitizing: The discontinuity after three. In J. Bideaud, C. Meljac, & J.-P. Fischer
(Eds.), Pathways to number (pp. 191–208). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Fuson, K. C. (1988). Children’s counting and concepts of number. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Gallistel, C. R., & Gelman, R. (1992). Preverbal and verbal counting and computation. Cognition, 44, 43–
74.
Gelman, R., & Cordes, S. (2001). Counting in animals and humans. In E. Dupoux (Ed.), Language, brain,
and cognitive development: Essays in honor of Jacques Mehler (pp. 279–301). Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Gelman, R., & Tucker, M. (1975). Further investigations of the young child’s conception of number. Child
Development, 46, 167–175.
Göbel, S. M., Johansen-Berg, H., Behrens, T., & Rushworth, M. F. S. (2004). Response-selection-related
parietal activation during number comparison. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16, 1536–
1551.
Göbel, S. M., & Rushworth, M. F. S. (2004). Cognitive neuroscience: Acting on numbers. Current Biology,
14, R517–R519.
Gordon, P. (2004, October 15). Numerical cognition without words: Evidence from Amazonia. Science,
306, 496–499.

Groen, G. J., & Parkman, J. M. (1972). A chronometric analysis of simple addition. Psychological Review,
79, 329–343.
Groen, G. J., & Resnick, L. B. (1977). Can preschool children invent addition algorithms? Journal of
Educational Psychology, 69, 645–652.
Huntley-Fenner, G. (2001). Children’s understanding of number is similar to adults’ and rats’: Numerical
estimation by 5–7-year-olds. Cognition, 78, B27–B40.
Huttenlocher, J., Jordan, N., & Levine, S. C. (1994). A mental model for early arithmetic. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 123, 284–296.
Jarvis, E. D., Güntürkün, O., Bruce, L., Csillag, A., Karten, H., Kuenzel, W., et al. (2005). Avian brains and
a new understanding of vertebrate evolution. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 6, 151–159.
Jordan, K., Schadow, J., Wuestenberg, T., Jeinze, H.-J., & Jäncke, L. (2004). Different cortical activations
for subjects using allocentric or egocentric strategies in a virtual navigation task. Brain Imaging,
15, 135–140.
Judge, P. G., Evans, T. A., & Vyas, D. K. (2005). Ordinal representation of numeric quantities by brown
capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior
Processes, 31, 79–94.
Kahneman, D., Treisman, A., & Gibbs, B. J. (1992). The reviewing of object files: Object specific
integration of information. Cognitive Psychology, 24, 175–219.
Kaufman, E. L., Lord, M. W., Reese, T. W., & Volkmann, J. (1949). The discrimination of visual number.
American Journal of Psychology, 62, 498–525.
Kawashima, R., Taira, M., Okita, K., Inoue, K., Tajima, N., Yoshida, H., et al. (2004). A functional MRI
study of simple arithmetic—a comparison between children and adults. Cognitive Brain Research,
18, 225–231.
Kilian, A., Yaman, S., von Fersen, L., & Güntürkün, O. (2003). A bottlenosed dolphin discriminates visual
stimuli differing in numerosity. Learning & Behavior, 31, 133–142.
Kline, M. (1972). Mathematical thought from ancient to modern times. New York: Oxford University Press.
Lemer, C., Dehaene, S., Spelke, E., & Cohen, L. (2003). Approximate quantities and exact number
words: Dissociable systems. Neuropsychologia, 41, 1942–1958.
Lyon, B. E. (2003, April 3). Egg recognition and counting reduce costs of avian conspecific brood
parasitism. Nature, 422, 495–499.
Mandler, G., & Shebo, B. J. (1982). Subitizing: An analysis of its component processes. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 111, 1–22.
Matsuzawa, T. (1985, May 2–8). Use of numbers by a chimpanzee. Nature, 315, 57–59.
McComb, K., Packer, C., & Pusey, A. (1994). Roaring and numerical assessment in contests between
groups of female lions, Pantera leo. Animal Behaviour, 47, 379–387.
Meck, W., & Church, R. (1983). A mode control model of counting and timing processes. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 9, 320–334.
Mix, K., Huttenlocher, J., & Levine, S. C. (2002). Quantitative development in infancy and early childhood.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Murofushi, K. (1997). Numerical matching behavior by a chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes): Subitizing and
analogue magnitude estimation. Japanese Psychological Research, 39, 140–153.
Nieder, A., Freedman, D. J., & Miller, E. K. (2002, September 6). Representation of the quantity of visual
items in the primate prefrontal cortex. Science, 297, 1708–1711.
Olson, M. V., & Varki, A. (2004, July 9). The chimpanzee genome—a bittersweet celebration. Science,
305, 191–192.
Olthof, A., & Roberts, W. A. (2000). Summation of symbols by pigeons (Columba livia): The importance of
number and mass of reward items. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 114, 158–166.
Pepperberg, I. M. (1981). Functional vocalizations by an African Grey parrot. Zeitschrift fu¨r
Tierpsychologie, 55, 139–160.

Pepperberg, I. M. (1987). Evidence for conceptual quantitative abilities in the African Grey parrot:
Labeling of cardinal sets. Ethology, 75, 37–61.
Pepperberg, I. M. (1988). Comprehension of “absence” by an African Grey parrot: Learning with respect
to questions of same/different. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 50, 553–564.
Pepperberg, I. M. (1990). Cognition in an African Grey parrot (Psittacus erithacus): Further evidence for
comprehension of categories and labels. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 104, 41–52.
Pepperberg, I. M. (1992). Proficient performance of a conjunctive, recursive task by an African Grey
parrot (Psittacus erithacus). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 106, 295–305.
Pepperberg, I. M. (1994). Evidence for numerical competence in an African Grey parrot (Psittacus
erithacus). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 108, 36–44.
Pepperberg, I. M. (1998). The African Grey parrot: How cognitive processing might affect allospecific
vocal learning. In R. P. Balda, I. M. Pepperberg, & A. C. Kamil (Eds.), Animal cognition in nature
(pp. 381–409). London: Academic Press.
Pepperberg, I. M. (1999). The Alex studies: Cognitive and communicative abilities of Grey parrots.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Pepperberg, I. M. (in press-a). Grey parrots do not always “parrot”: Roles of imitation and phonological
awareness in the creation of new labels from existing vocalizations. Language Sciences.
Pepperberg, I. M. (in press-b). Ordinality and inferential abilities of a Grey parrot (Psittacus erithacus).
Journal of Comparative Psychology.
Pepperberg, I. M., & Brezinsky, M. V. (1991). Acquisition of a relative class concept by an African Grey
parrot (Psittacus erithacus): Discriminations based on relative size. Journal of Comparative
Psychology, 105, 286–294.
Pepperberg, I. M., & Gordon, J. D. (2005). Number comprehension by a Grey parrot (Psittacus erithacus),
including a zero-like concept. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 119, 197–209.
Pepperberg, I. M., & Kozak, F. A. (1986). Object permanence in the African Grey parrot (Psittacus
erithacus). Animal Learning & Behavior, 14, 322–330.
Pepperberg, I. M., & Wilkes, S. R. (2004). Lack of referential vocal learning from LCD video by Grey
parrots (Psittacus erithacus). Interaction Studies, 5, 75–97.
Piazza, M., Giacomini, E., Le Bihan, D., & Dehaene, S. (2003). Single-trial classification of parallel preattentive and serial attentive processes using functional magnetic resonance imaging.
Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 270, 1237–1245.
Premack, D. (1976). Intelligence in ape and man. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Rousselle, L., Palmer, E., & Noe¨l, M.-P. (2004). Magnitude comparison in preschoolers: What counts?
Influence of perceptual variables. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 87, 57–84.
Rumbaugh, D. M., Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S., & Hegel, M. (1987). Summation in a chimpanzee (Pan
troglodytes). Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 13, 107–115.
Rumbaugh, D. M., Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S., & Pate, J. L. (1988). Addendum to “Summation in a
chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes).” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes,
14, 118–120.
Shumaker, R. W., Palkovich, A. M., Beck, B. B., Guagnano, G. A., & Morowitz, H. (2001). Spontaneous
use of magnitude discrimination and ordination by the orangutan (Pongo pygmaeus). Journal of
Comparative Psychology, 115, 385–391.
Siegler, R. S. (1987). The perils of averaging data over strategies: An example from children’s addition.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 12, 349–372.
Simon, T. J. (1999). The foundations of numerical thinking in a brain without numbers. Trends in
Cognitive Science, 3, 363–365.
Simon, T. J., & Vaishnavi, S. (1996). Subitizing and counting depend on different attentional mechanisms:
Evidence from visual enumeration in afterimages. Perception & Psychophysics, 58, 915–926.

Smith, B. R., Piel, A. K., & Candland, D. K. (2003). Numerity of a socially housed hamadryas baboon
(Papio hamadryas) and a socially housed squirrel monkey (Saimiri sciureus). Journal of
Comparative Psychology, 117, 217–225.
Sophian, C. (1995). Children’s numbers. Madison, WI: Brown and Benchmark.
Spelke, E. S., & Dehaene, S. (1999). Biological foundations of numerical thinking. Trends in Cognitive
Science, 3, 365–366.
Spelke, E. S., & Tsivkin, S. (2001). Language and number: A bilingual training study. Cognition, 78, 45–
88.
Thomas, R. K. (1992). Primates’ conceptual use of number: Ecological perspectives and psychological
processes. In T. Nishida, W. C. McGrew, P. Marler, M. Pickford, & F. B. M. de Waal (Eds.),
Topics in primatology: Vol. I. Human origins (pp. 305–314). Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
Thompson, N. S. (1968). Counting and communication in crows. Communications in Behavioral Biology,
2, 223–225.
Trick, L., & Pylyshyn, Z. (1989). Subitizing and the FNST spatial index model. (COGMEM #44). University
of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada.
Trick, L., & Pylyshyn, Z. (1994). Why are small and large numbers enumerated differently? A limitedcapacity preattentive stage in vision. Psychological Review, 101, 80–102.
Uller, C., Carey, S., Huntley-Fenner, G., & Klatt, L. (1999). What representations might underlie infant
numerical knowledge? Cognitive Development, 14, 1–36.
von Glasersfeld, E. (1982). Subitizing: The role of figural patterns in the development of numerical
concepts. Archives de Psychologie, 50, 191–218.
Walsh, V. (2003). Cognitive neuroscience: Numerate neurons. Current Biology, 13, R447–R448.
Wellman, H. M., & Miller, K. F. (1986). Thinking about nothing: Development of concepts of zero. British
Journal of Developmental Psychology, 4, 31–42.
Xia, L., Emmerton, J., Siemann, M., & Delius, J. D. (2001). Pigeons (Columba livia) learn to link
numerosities with symbols. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 115, 83–91.
Zur, O., & Gelman, R. (2004). Young children can add and subtract by predicting and checking. Early
Childhood Research Quarterly, 19, 121–137.

Appendix.
All Trials From Experiment 1
Question
Response Comment
1. 2 + 1 = ?
3
2. 4 + 2 = ?
6
3. 3 + 1 = ?
4
4. 1 + 1 = ?
2
5. 3 + 2 = ?
3, 5
Hits cup with beak, he says “3”; experimenter repeats question, he says “5”
6. 1 + 0 = ?
1
Trial uses same-size candy hearts
7. 3 + 3 = ?
6
Trial uses same-size candy hearts
8. 0 + 1 = ?
1
9. 3 + 0 = ?
3
10. 2 + 2 = ?
4
11. 1 + 4 = ?
5
First hits cups, says “blue” (color of cups); experimenter repeats question, he says “5”
12. 0 + 2 = ?
2
13. 4 + 0 = ?
4
14. 5 + 1 = ?
6
15. 2 + 3 = ?
5
16. 1 + 0 = ?
1
17. 1 + 1 = ?
2
Trial uses same-size candy hearts
18. 1 + 2 = ?
3
19. 3 + 3 = ?
6
20. 0 + 1 = ?
1
21. 2 + 0 = ?
2
22. 2 + 2 = ?
4
23. 3 + 2 = ?
2, 3, 5
Looks at, taps each cup, says “2,” then “3”; experimenter says “total,” he says “5”
24. 0 + 3 = ?
3
25. 1 + 1 = ?
5, 2
26. 1 + 3 = ?
4
27. 6 + 0 =?
6
28. 5 + 0 = ?
6, 6, 6, 6
Repeat with 10–15 s, he says “5”
29. 0 + 1 = ?
1
30. 1 + 2 = ?
3
Trial uses same-size candy hearts
31. 0 + 5 = ? *
6, 6, 6, 6
Repeat with 10–15 s, he says “5”; uses same-sized hearts
32. 4 + 0 = ?
4
33. 0 + 2 = ?
2
34. 3 + 0 = ?
3
35. 1 + 0 = ?
1
36. 3 + 3 = ?
3, 6
37. 4 + 1 = ?
5
38. 3 + 1 = ?
3, 4
Trial uses same-size candy hearts
39. 1 + 5 = ?
6
40. 1 + 1 = ?
2
First says “green wool” (tray cover), then “blue” (cup color), then “2”
41. 0 + 3 = ?
3
42. 0 + 1 = ?
1
43. 0 + 4 = ?
4
44. 2 + 1 = ?
3
45. 5 + 0 = ?
5
46. 1 + 0 = ?
1
No response until experimenter queried Griffin
47. 0 + 6 = ?
6
48. 2 + 0 = ?
2
Note. Order of numbers represents placement on tray.
* Alex is given 10–15 s to respond from here on.

